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This article deals with a complex and conceptually difficult phase
of bankruptcy law. It is not written for the beginner, for it does
not contain all the background material necessary to effectuate a
full understanding of the area. But it is extremely objective, and it
exhaustively treats the relevant appellate court decisions. For the
informed reader, therefore, it is both thought-provoking and an
invaluable research tool.
U NDER WHAT circumstances and to what extent may a bank-
ruptcy court, in the exercise of its summary jurisdiction, grant
an affirmative money judgment against a claimant and in favor of
a trustee where the trustee has filed a counterclaim which exceeds,
in amount, the claim filed by the creditor? This has been, and re-
mains, one of the most troublesome questions' in the administration
of the Bankruptcy Act,2 notwithstanding the recent decision of the
Supreme Court in Katchen v. Landy.3 The question has produced
a fertile field for litigation,4 and it will continue to occupy the time
of the courts until the Bankruptcy Act is amended5 or the Supreme
Court gives the matter further definitive treatment. As we shall see,
different circuits have given different answers to the various facets
of the question, and confusion exists even within the same circuit.
Under section 57n of the Bankruptcy Act,0 claims which are not
filed within six months after the first date set for the initial meet-
* A.B. 1938, LL.B. 1940, George Washington University. Member of the Texas Bar.
t BB.A. 1959, Texas Technological College; LL.B. 1962, University of Texas. Mem-
ber of the Texas Bar.
1 "The problem . .. haa developed more facets than a dime store ruby." Palmer,
The Supreme Court Speaks on Bankruptcy; A Review of Katchen v. Landy, Segal v.
Rochelle, and United States v. Speers, 40 REF. J. 44 (1966).
252 Stat. 840 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. (1964).
382 U.S. 323 (1966).
'4 CoLxIE, BANruRPTcY 68.20[4] (14th ed. 1964) [hereinafter cited as CoLLiER]
cites over 50 cases in discussing this relatively narrow point.
'It has been argued that the probability of amendment is slight. Comment, 34
FoRDHAm L. Rxv. 469, 481 & n.104 (1966).
6 Bankruptcy Act § 57n, 52 Stat. 867 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 9a(n) (1964).
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ing of creditors are not allowed and may not participate in divi-
dends. If a creditor knows or fears that the trustee has a cause of
action against him which exceeds his claim, then the creditor is
faced with a difficult decision. If he fails to file his claim, he will
not receive his share of the bankrupt estate, and if the bankrupt is
discharged, the claim may be forever barred.7 If, however, he files
the claim, he lays himself open to the trustee's counterclaim, which
may be determined in summary bankruptcy proceedings-without
a jury."
The trustee's counterclaim may fall into one of several categories.
The trustee may assert that the creditor has received a voidable
preference under section 60,9 or seek to set aside fraudulent transfers
under sections 67d'0 or 70e;11 additionally, the counterclaim could
be based on any legal right which the estate has against the creditor.
In any case, the counterclaim may arise out of the same transaction
or occurrence as that which gave rise to the claim, or it may be en-
tirely unrelated to the claim. So long as the trustee's claim is as-
serted only to reduce or extinguish the creditor's claim, there is no
question that the bankruptcy court has jurisdiction to entertain it
in any of these situations.12
7 The choice is thus not so simple as the concurring opinion in Katchen v. Landy,
836 F.2d 535, 539 (10th Cir. 1964), aff'd, 382 U.S. 328 (1966), would have us believe:
"The decision here is whether to become a moving party and also to submit the
adjudication of claims and preferences to the bankruptcy court without a jury, or
whether to forego the filing of his claim and wait to become a defendant."
1 A claimant may also invoke the jurisdiction of the court by filing a reclamation
petition or a petition to abandon. A reclamation petition is filed where the trustee
has possession of a particular res to which the'letitioner claims title. A petition to
abandon may be filed by a secured creditor who contends that the administration by
the court of the particular res would be burdensome because valid liens exceed the
value of the res, and no equity exists for unsecured creditors.
9Bankruptcy Act § 60, 52 Stat. 869 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 96 (1964).
This section defines a preference and provides, in subsection b, that the preference
may be avoided by the trustee if the creditor had reasonable cause to believe that the
debtor was insolvent at the time when the transfer was made.
20 Bankruptcy Act § 67d, 52 Stat. 877 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 107 (d) (1964).
This section makes voidable by the trustee certain transfers within one year prior
to the filing of the bankruptcy petition, which were made without fair consideration
or with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors. This section also enables
the trustee to avoid certain transfers made within four months of bankruptcy, and
in contemplation of the filing of the bankruptcy petition or with intent to use the
consideration to effect a preference.
Il Bankruptcy Act § 70e, 52 Stat. 882 (1988), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 110(e) (1964).
This section arms the trustee with all powers of avoidance held by any actual creditor
of the bankrupt under applicable state law.
124 Cou-Tma 68.20[4], at 805. The problem here considered arises where the
trustee attempts to obtain judgment in the summary bankruptcy proceeding for the
excess of his counterclaim over the creditor's claim.
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I
SUMMARY V. PLENARY JURISDICTION
Usually, proceedings in a bankruptcy court-that is, a federal
district court sitting in its bankruptcy capacity13-are "summary,"
as opposed to proceedings which are "plenary." It is important,
therefore, to distinguish between the two.
A "plenary" suit is a suit of the ordinary character, commenced
by complaint or petition filed in a United States district court or in
a state court. Juries may be had in proper cases. In a "summary"
bankruptcy proceeding, on the other hand, the action is commenced
by an application for relief, followed by an order to the re-
spondent to show cause. Trial is to the referee sitting without a
jury, but the trial is otherwise conducted in the same manner as a
similar trial would be conducted before the federal judge-the same
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the same rules of evidence
apply. Appeal from the ruling of the referee is by "petition for
review"'14 to the district judge, and thereafter to the court of appeals.
Summary proceedings are most unfortunately named. The very
word "summary" brings up visions of "drumhead justice," but
these writers know of no experienced bankruptcy practitioners
who would make such a contention.' 5 Indeed, the full protection of
due process applies to proceedings in the bankruptcy court.16 If there
has been a reluctance on the part of some courts of appeals to ex-
tend the summary jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts, it may be
traced, in part at least, to long-held prejudices harking back to the
years when referees' compensation was based on a percentage of assets
administered. 17
II
APPLICABLE STATUTES AND RULES
To the extent that the bankruptcy courts have been granted
jurisdiction to render affirmative money judgments on trustees'
counterclaims, the power has been implied from express jurisdic-
"3See Bankruptcy Act § 1(10), 66 Stat. 420 (1952), 11 U.S.C. § 1(10) (1964).
" Bankruptcy Act § 39c, 74 Stat. 528 (1960), 11 U.S.C. § 67 (c) (1964).
1GSee Treister, Bankruptcy Jurisdiction: Is It Too Summary?, 39 So. CAL. L. Rv.
78 (1966).
16In re Wood & Henderson, 210 U.S. 246, 253 (1908) (requiring notice and op-
pQrtunity to be heard even where statute did not).
17For a discussion of misconceptions about summary bankruptcy proceedings, see
Rochelle & King, A Proposal to Raise Bankruptcy Courts to District Court Level, 13
KAN. L. Rav. 391 (1965).
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tional grants in certain sections of the Bankruptcy Act. Conversely,
the language contained in some of these sections has led some courts
to restrict the bankruptcy court in the exercise of such jurisdiction.
A familiarity with these provisions is therefore essential to the under-
standing of the problem.
Section 2a (2)18 empowers the bankruptcy court to "allow claims,
disallow claims, reconsider allowed or disallowed claims, and allow
or disallow them against bankrupt estates," and section 2a (7) pro-
vides, in part:
where in a controversy arising in a proceeding under this Act
an adverse party does not interpose objection to the summary
jurisdiction of the Court of Bankruptcy, by answer or motion
filed before the expiration of the time prescribed by law or rule
of court, or fixed or extended by order of court for the filing of
an answer to the petition, motion, or other pleading to which he
is adverse, he shall be deemed to have consented to such juris-
diction.19
This latter section probably does not apply to claims filed by
creditors .20
The bankruptcy court does not have jurisdiction in all situations,
however. Section 23a provides:
The United States district courts shall have jurisdiction of all
controversies at law and in equity, as distinguished from proceed-
ings under this Act, between receivers and trustees as such and
adverse claimants, concerning the property acquired or claimed
by the receivers or trustees, in the same manner and to the same
extent as though such proceedings had not been instituted and
such controversies had been between the bankrupts and such ad-
verse claimants.2 '
The traditional test of the dividing line between the summary juris-
diction of the bankruptcy court and this plenary jurisdiction of the
district court, especially in turnover-order situations, has been pos-
session of the property in dispute. If the bankrupt on the date of
bankruptcy had possession, either actual or constructive, or if an
28 Bankruptcy Act § 2a (2), 52 Stat. 842 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 11(a) (2) (1964).
19 Bankruptcy Act § 2a (7), 66 Stat. 420 (1952), 11 U.S.C. § 11(a) (7) (1964).
20 This provision was enacted to clarify and limit the effect of Cline v. Kaplan, 323
U.S. 97 (1944), and apparently applies only where the adverse party is involuntarily
brought into court. Continental Cas. Co. v. White, 269 F.2d 213, 216 (4th Cir. 1959);
Inter-State Nat'l Bank v. Luther, 221 F.2d 382, 387 (10th Cir. 1955), cert. dismissed
per stipulation, 350 U.S. 944 (1956).
22 Bankruptcy Act § 23a, 52 Stat. 854 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 46 (a) (1964).
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"adverse" claimant's possession is merely colorable, then summary
jurisdiction will lie. One court, at least, has utilized the possession
test to deny summary jurisdiction even when a counterclaim on a
preference was in issue.
22
Section 23b limits the coverage of section 23a:
Suits by the receiver and the trustee shall be brought or prose-
cuted only in the courts where the bankrupt might have brought or
prosecuted them if proceedings under this Act had not been in-
stituted, unless by consent of the defendant, except as provided in
sections 60, 67, and 70 of this Act.23
By its terms, this section involves consent to jurisdiction by a de-
fendant, and hence appears inapplicable where a creditor has be-
come the moving party by filing a claim.2 4 Nevertheless, some courts
have considered section 23b to be the basis for the theory that a
creditor who files a claim in a summary proceeding consents to ad-
judication of counterclaims raised by the trustee.2 5
Identical provisions in sections 60b,26 67e,27 and 70e (3)28 vest
concurrent jurisdiction in state and federal courts for the recovery
and avoidance of preferences and fraudulent conveyances. The
language used is the following: "For the purpose of any recovery or
avoidance under this section, where plenary proceedings are neces-
sary, any State court which would have had jurisdiction if bank-
ruptcy had not intervened and any court of bankruptcy shall have
concurrent jurisdiction." 29 The italicized portion of this provision
has caused some difficulty, but it is now clear that this wording au-
thorizes both plenary and summary proceedings for the recovery
and avoidance of fraudulent transfers and preferences.30
Section 57 deals with the proof and allowance of claims, and
subsection g provides:
22 See B. F. Avery & Sons v. Davis, 192 F.2d 255, 259 (5th Cir. 1951), cert. denied,
342 U.S. 945 (1952).
-3Bankruptcy Act § 23b, 52 Stat. 854 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 46(b) (1964). (Emphasis
added.)
24 Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 332 n.9 (1966); Seligson & King, Jurisdiction
and Venue in Bankruptcy, 36 REF. J. 73, 79 (1962).
2 E.g., Gill v. Phillips, 337 F.2d 258, 262 (5th Cir. 1964); see notes 94-99, 105-06,
118-20 infra and accompanying text.
26 Bankruptcy Act § 60b, 52 Stat. 870 (1938); 11 U.S.C. § 96(b) (1964).
-7 Bankruptcy Act § 67e, 52 Stat. 878 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 107 (e) (1964).
Bankruptcy Act § 70e (3), 52 Stat. 882 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 110(e) (3) (1964).
-Emphasis added. The wording of the introductory clause is slightly different in
§ 70e (3).
10 Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 331 (1966).
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The claims of creditors who have received or acquired prefer-
ences, liens, conveyances, transfers, assignments or encumbrances,
void or voidable under this Act, shall not be allowed unless such
creditors shall surrender such preferences, liens, conveyances,
transfers, assignments, or encumbrances. 31
Thus, the trustee may object to and prevent allowance of a claim
unless preferences are first returned to the estate. Whether this sec-
tion permits the trustee to compel surrender of a preference is, of
course, a different matter.
Section 68 deals with set-offs and counterclaims, and subsection
a provides: "In all cases of mutual debts or mutual credits between
the estate of a bankrupt and a creditor the account shall be stated
and one debt shall be set off against the other, and the balance only
shall be allowed or paid."3 2 This section seems to give some sup-
port to allowing counterclaims by trustees. It expresses the idea of
"clearing the books" between the bankrupt and the creditor.
General Order 37 3 makes the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
applicable to proceedings in bankruptcy insofar as they are not in-
consistent with the act. Rule 13 (a) defines a compulsory counter-
claim as one which "arises out of the transaction or occurrence that
is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim and does not re-
quire for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the
court cannot acquire jurisdiction."3 4 Rule 13 (b)3 5 provides for
the assertion of permissive counterclaims." If the claim filed by a
creditor can be analogized to a complaint under the Federal Rules,
then does rule 13 (a) compel a bankruptcy court to adjudicate com-
pulsory counterclaims? And does rule 13 (b) provide a jurisdictional
basis for summary adjudication of permissive counterclaims?
III
ALEXANDER V. HILLMAN
Alexander v. Hillman' is the progenitor of Katchen. It was not
a bankruptcy case, but rather involved an equity receivership filed
31 Bankruptcy Act § 57g, 52 Stat. 866 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 93 (g) (1964).
32 Bankruptcy Act § 68a, 52 Stat. 878 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 108(a) (1964).
305 U.S. 698 (1939), 11 U.S.C. App. Order 37 (1964).
3' FED. R. Crv. P. 13 (a).
as FED. R. Civ. P. 13 (b).
36 Unfortunately for the solution of the problem under discussion, it is not always
easy to determine,, in a given fact situation, whether a counterclaim is "compulsory" or
"permissive." See 3 MoORE, FEDERAL PRacncE 13.13 (2d ed. 1964).
"' 296 U.S. 222 (1935).
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in West Virginia to liquidate the assets of a West Virginia cor-
poration. Pennsylvania stockholder-officers filed claims in the West
Virginia proceedings, and were met by the receivers' counterclaims
alleging fraud by the claimants. Other counterclaims by the re-
ceivers were later asserted-including a charge that excessive salaries
had been paid-and an accounting was sought for misappropriated
assets. The claimants contested the jurisdiction of the court, arguing
that they were entitled to a plenary determination of the counter-
claims against them in the state of their residence.38
Mr. Justice Butler, speaking for the Court, held that by filing
their claims in the receivership proceeding, the respondents sub-
mitted themselves to the court's jurisdiction in respect to all de-
fenses that might be made by the receivers.3 9 The right given by
section 51 of the Judicial Code40 to be sued in the district of the de-
fendant's residence was construed by the court to be merely a "per-
sonal privilege that may be waived,"4' and the privilege was said not
to affect the general jurisdiction of the court.42
The respondent's contention was construed to mean
that, while invoking the court's jurisdiction to establish their
right to participate in the distribution, they may deny its power
to require them to account for what they misappropriated. In be-
half of creditors and stockholders, the receivers reasonably may
insist that, before taking aught, respondents may by the receiver-
ship court be required to make restitution. That requirement is in
harmony with the rule generally followed by courts of equity
that having jurisdiction of the parties to controversies brought
before them, they will decide all matters in dispute and decree
complete relief.43
The court of appeals had held that the district court had juris-
diction to pass on all defenses against the claims, but denied affirma-
tive relief to the receivers. The Supreme Court reversed on this
point, sanctioning the jurisdiction of the equity court to grant
88 Id. at 230-36.
so Id. at 241.
4 0 Judicial Code § 51, as amended, ch. 345, 42 Stat. 849 (1922), as amended (now
28 U.S.C. § 1391 (1964)): "no civil suit shall be brought in any district court against
any person by any original process or proceeding in any other district than that
whereof he is an inhabitant.
296 U.S. at 240.
42 Ibid.
" Id. at 241-42.
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affirmative relief in the West Virginia proceeding without requiring
the receivers to seek relief in a plenary Pennsylvania suit.44
Prior to Hillman, the bankruptcy cases had held that a bank-
ruptcy court's jurisdiction over counterclaims was effective only to
the extent necessary to offset the creditor's claim, and that a plenary
suit was necessary to collect any excess due the estate.4 As we shall
see, several courts seized upon Hillman to extend the summary
jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts.
IV
INTER-STATE V. LUTHER
Before examining the summary jurisdiction cases in detail, and
in order to better understand Katchen, let us look at Inter-State
Nat'l Bank v. Luther,46 a decision of the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals. Prior to this case, extension of summary jurisdiction had
been limited to compulsory counterclaim situations, where both the
claim and the counterclaim arose out of the same transaction. In
giving relief to the trustee for a permissive counterclaim, Luther
thus constituted the most liberal decision in this area.47
In Luther, the bank filed its claim in the bankruptcy proceeding
based on a certain promissory note in the amount of 50,000 dollars.
The trustee counterclaimed on the ground that the bank had re-
ceived a 150,000-dollar voidable preference from the payment of
two prior notes. The referee found for the trustee and decreed that
the trustee recover the excess from the bank. The district judge
affirmed. 48
One of the bank's principal defenses in the court of appeals
was that the notes forming the basis for the counterclaim were
separate and distinct transactions from the note on which the claim
was based and that the court had no jurisdiction to render an af-
firmative judgment on a permissive counterclaim. 49 Judge Murrah,
"Id. at 242-43.
"5In re Vadner, 17 F.2d 721 (9th Cir. 1927); Fitch v. Richardson, 147 Fed. 197
(1st Cir. 1906); In re Patterson-MacDonald Shipbuilding Co., 284 Fed. 281 (W.D.
Wash. 1922), aff'd on other grounds, 293 Fed. 192 (9th Cir. 1923), cert. denied, 264
U.S. 582 (1924).
40221 F.2d 382 (10th Cir. 1955), cert. dismissed per stipulation, 350 U.S. 944
(1956).
47 Luther was later modified by the Tenth Circuit in Katchen. See text accompany-
ing notes 53-55 infra.
48 See 221 F.2d at 385-86.
'Old. at 389-90.
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writing for the majority of an en banc court, held that the bank
had impliedly consented to jurisdiction by filing the claim, and
affirmed the district judge and the referee. Rule 13 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure was considered as a grant of jurisdiction,
and since the bank had consented to jurisdiction, the distinction
between compulsory and permissive counterclaims was said to be of
no consequence.50
Chief Judge Phillips, joined by Judge Pickett, vigorously dis-
sented, urging that the traditional tests for summary jurisdiction-
whether the res is in the actual or constructive possession of the
bankrupt on the date of bankruptcy, and whether the adverse claim
is real and substantial or merely colorable-should be applied. The
Chief Judge would have relegated the trustee to a plenary suit to
recover the preference.6'
V
KATCHEN V. LANDY
In Katchen v. Landy,52 an officer of the bankrupt corporation
had become an accommodation maker on notes given to two banks
for indebtedness owed by the bankrupt. The officer filed two claims
in the bankruptcy proceeding, one for rent due from the bankrupt
and the other for the recovery of a payment made from his personal
funds on one of the notes. The trustee counterclaimed, asserting
that certain prior payments to the bank, made with funds of the
bankrupt, had served to reduce the officer's personal liability on the
notes and were, therefore, preferential as to him. Another counter-
claim of the trustee was based on an unpaid stock subscription.
The officer made timely objection to the exercise of summary juris-
diction, but the referee overruled the objection and rendered judg-
ment for the trustee on both the preferences and the stock sub-
Scription. The district court sustained the referee.
53
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, again sitting en
banc, reconsidered its opinion in the Luther case and said:
I' Id. at 390.51 1d. at 401 (dissenting opinion). This was the approach taken by the Fifth
Circuit in B. F. Avery & Sons v. Davis, 192 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1951), cert. denied,
342 U.S. 945 (1952), discussed in text accompanying notes 135-37 infra. Judge. Phillips
distinguished other cases on the ground that they involved compulsory counter-
claims.
r2 336 F.2d 535 (10th Cir. 1964), aff'd, 382 U.S. 323 (1966).
68 336 F.2d at 535-36.
Vol. 1966: 669][
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
[I]n the light of subsequent decisions and commentary, we have
decided to adhere to its [Luther's] pronouncements. But, we de-
cline to extend the summary jurisdiction of the court by implied
consent to counterclaims which do not involve a preference, set-
off, voidable lien, or a fraudulent transfer, and which are wholly
unrelated to the creditor's claim.54
Thus, the Tenth Circuit took back its apparent former blessing
on summary jurisdiction of permissive counterclaims. It affirmed
the lower court for the amount of the voidable preferences, but
reversed the judgment for the amount of the stock subscription.
The trustee did not seek review in the Supreme Court of the
adverse decision on the stock subscription.55 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari on the officer's request because of the conflict
between the tenth and other circuits, and the Fifth Circuit.50
Mr. Justice White, writing for the majority of the Court, con-
ceded that the Bankruptcy Act does not expressly confer summary
jurisdiction to order claimants to surrender preferences, but pointed
out that Congress has often left the exact scope of summary pro-
ceedings to be determined by the courts.57 The Court referred to
congressional committee reports in which special attention was given
to the necessity for inexpensive and expedient administration of
bankrupt estates,58 and then noted the express power of the trustee
to allow claims and inquire into their validity and his concurrent
duty under section 47a (8)19 to inquire into the claims and make
objections in proper cases. 0
Special emphasis was laid on section 57g of the act- which was
said to be "part and parcel of the allowance process."0 2 Objections
thereunder were "subject to summary adjudication by the bank-
ruptcy court. This is the plain import of § 57 and finds support in
the same policy of expedition that underlies the necessity for sum-
154 Id. at 537.
" This was tragic. If the trustee had taken up the permissive counterclaim issue,
we might now have a definitive pronouncement from the Supreme Court on the
whole area of affirmative judgments on trustees' counterclaims.
856 382 U:S. at 326.
11 Id. at 328.
11 d. at 328-29.
59 Bankruptcy Act § 47a (8), 52 Stat. 861 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 75 (a) (8) (1964).
0 382 U.S. at 829-30.
0152 Stat. 866 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 93(g) (1964).
02 382 U.S. at 830.
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mary action in many other proceedings under the Act."63 As to
affirmative relief in favor of the trustee, section 57g was made the
foundation of the Court's ruling by the following language:
[O]nce it is established that the issue of preference may be sum-
marily adjudicated . . . it can hardly be doubted that there is
also summary jurisdiction to order the return of the preference.
This is so because in passing on a § 5 7g objection a bankruptcy
court must necessarily determine the amount of preference, if
any, so as to ascertain whether the claimant... has satisfied the
condition imposed by § 57g on allowance of the claim.... Thus,
once a bankruptcy court has dealt with the preference issue
nothing remains for adjudication in a plenary suit. The normal
rules of res judicata and collateral estoppel apply .... More spe-
cifically, a creditor who offers a proof of claim and demands its
allowance is bound by what is judicially determined . . . . To
require the trustee to commence a plenary action in such cir-
cumstances would be a meaningless gesture, and it is well within
the equitable powers of the bankruptcy court to order return of
the preference during the summary proceedings ....
The Court then quoted the Hillman language set out above6 5 to
the effect that equity will decide all matters in dispute and decree
complete relief.
Mr. Justice White then turned to the question of the respon-
dent's right to a jury trial under the seventh amendment. The
Bankruptcy Act, passed pursuant to constitutional authority, was
said to convert the creditor's legal claim into an equitable claim to
a pro rata share of the res, and the right of trial by jury does not
extend to cases of equity jurisdiction.66 Petitioner had urged the
Beacon and Dairy Queen doctrine,0 7 which was said to be that
"'where both legal and equitable issues are presented in a single
case, "only under the most imperative circumstances . . .can the
right to a jury trial of legal issues be lost through prior determina-
e3Id. at 330-31. This policy of expedition via summary proceedings was not
negated, said the Court, by any other section of the act. The language of section 60b,
52 Stat. 870 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 96(b) (1964), conferring concurrent jurisdiction on
state courts and federal district courts to entertain plenary suits for the recovery
of preferences, was said to contemplate nonplenary recovery proceedings as well be-
cause the language "where plenary suits are necessary" could be interpreted in no
other way. 382 U.S. at 381.
61 Id. at 333-35.
61 See text accompanying note 43 supra.
e" 382 U.S. at 336-37.
07 Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959); Dairy Queen, Inc. v.
Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962).
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tion of equitable claims."' "68 These cases were distinguished by
the fact that in neither of them was there involved a specific
statutory scheme contemplating the prompt trial of a disputed
claim without the intervention of a jury. 9 Finally, the Court
concluded that "to implement congressional intent, we think it
essential to hold that the bankruptcy court may summarily adjudi-
cate the § 57g objection; and .. . the power to adjudicate the ob-
jection carries with it the power to order surrender of the pref-
erence."70 Justices Black and Douglas dissented for the reasons
stated by Judge Phillips in his dissenting opinion in the court of
appeals.71
The Supreme Court opinion is as important for what it does
not say as for what it says. The Court refused to pass on the con-
sent theory-that by filing a claim a creditor consents to summary
adjudication of counterclaims-upon which several courts of ap-
peals had predicated jurisdiction. No mention was made of rule 13
of the Federal Rules. This will cause considerable speculation on
what the Court's holding might have been if a permissive counter-
claim had been involved. That the preferences here considered
were compulsory counterclaims was not stated to be a determining
factor in the Court's decision.72 No hint was given as to the form
which the referee's order should have taken, although in its brief
statement of the facts, the Court referred to the referee's order as a
"judgment."73
The opinion is carefully written with what appears to be a
studied effort to restrict the holding to the narrow facts of the case.
It is difficult to see any illumination in the still dark area of non-57g
counterclaims.7 4 However, for those who favor the extension of
summary jurisdiction, some comfort can be obtained from the fact
that the Court laid great stress on what it considered to be a con-
gressional intention to favor inexpensive and expedient bankruptcy
os s82 U.S. at 338.
69 Id. at 339.
70 Id. at 340.
" Ibid.
72 See id. at 326 n.l.
73 Id. at 325.
7 But see Macey, Katchen vs. Landy: A Milestone Along the Summary Jurisdiction
Road, 71 Com. L.J. 68, 69 (1966): "It can hardly be doubted that all circuits will
exercise summary jurisdiction to render affirmative judgments on offsets and counter-
claims arising out of the subject matter of the proof of claim, as well as to deter-
mine Section 57 (g) objections."
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administration, even at the sacrifice of the respondent's claim to
trial by jury.
VI
THE SITUATION IN THE CIRCUITS
Katchen has merely sharpened rather than solved the inquiries
in this area. Lower court opinions must be re-examined in the
light of Katchen, of course, but most of them seem either unaf-
fected by or distinguishable from Katchen's narrow coverage. What
follows here is an attempt to analyze, circuit by circuit, the holdings
of the various courts of appeals on these problems. Space limita-
tions have prohibited the discussion of many of the district court
decisions. The varied and complex theories which have been sug-
gested and developed should become clearer to the reader as he
progresses through the ensuing discussion.
A. First Circuit
The First Circuit has had no opportunity to reconsider the
problem since many years before the Supreme Court's Hillman
decision. It therefore continues to be represented, speaking strictly
if not realistically, by its early decision in Fitch v. Richardson,75
a typical pre-Hillman holding that a bankruptcy court could not
enter an affirmative judgment on a trustee's counterclaim, even
though the counterclaim arose out of the same subject matter as the
original claim.
B. Sixth Circuit
The problem has never been before the Sixth Circuit. A Ken-
tucky district court in In the Matter of Scott-Frederick Motor Co.""
has relied on cases from other circuits to hold that a referee has
jurisdiction to grant affirmative relief to a trustee on a related
counterclaim because the creditor consents to such jurisdiction
when he files his claim. One Ohio district court case is in accord77
and another appears contra. 78
75147 Fed. 197 (1st Cir. 1906).
71177 F. Supp. 758 (E.D. Ky. 1959).
" In the Matter of Morrison-Barnhart Motors, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 845 (N.D. Ohio
1956).
"In re Poston Const. Corp., 115 F. Supp. 323, 330-31 (N.D. Ohio 1953) ("it may
well be that a plenary suit ... will be required to set aside the alleged preferential
transfer').
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C. Eighth Circuit
In Floro Realty & Inv. Co. v. Steem Elec. Corp.,79 a chapter X
proceeding, 0 a petitioner in the bankruptcy court alleged breach
of a lease under which the debtor held certain property and prayed
surrender of the leased premises. It was held that the petitioner
had invoked the court's jurisdiction and was hence subject to the
trustee's counterclaim for return of a security deposit made by the
debtor under the lease. The court made no careful distinction 'be-
tween compulsory and permissive counterclaims, although the claim
in issue seems clearly to be the former.
Floro is one of the pioneering post-Hillman decisions. Its reason-
ing is general at best, and the Eighth Circuit has not clarified its
position to date.8' It is thus difficult to predict how the Eighth
Circuit today would handle a permissive-or even a compulsory-
counterclaim. We know at least, however, that the Eighth Circuit's
earlier decisions in Atwood-Larson Co. v. Hasvold82 and Triangle
Elec. Co. v. Foutch,83 both of which held that a trustee could not
assert a voidable transfer or preference against a claimant in bank-
ruptcy court but instead had to resort to a plenary suit, have been
overruled by Katchen.
D. Third Circuit
The case of In re Solar Mfg. Corp.,84 a chapter X matter, con-
cerned the trustee's counterclaims on both preferential payments
under section 67 and other causes of action related to the creditor's
claim. Holding that the reorganization court had summary jurisdic-
tion over the subject matter of the trustee's counterclaims, the court
stated:
In Hillman [and other cases] .... as in this appeal, the sub-
ject matter of the counterclaim arose out of the same transaction
as the claim. This is important because in those circumstances,
as we have above indicated, the trustee may have a summary
'1 128 F.2d 338 (8th Cir. 1942).
80 Bankruptcy Act ch. X, 52 Stat. 883 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. §§ 501-676
(1964). Chapter X provides means for a near-bankrupt to resolve its financial diffi-
culties and continue in business in a reorganized form.
a' in fact, the waters were muddied somewhat by Solomon v. Allied Bldg. Credits,
Inc., 209 F.2d 828 (8th Cir. 1954) (no consent to summary jurisdiction implied by
mere filing of claim).
62280 Fed. 385 (8th Cir. 1922).
"3 40 F.2d 353 (8th Cir. 1930).
81200 F.2d 327 (3d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 940 (1953).
[Vol. 1966: 669
JURISDICTION IN BANKRUPTCY
adjudication of the issues upon which his counterclaim depends
by raising these issues in his answer to the claim. Appellant offers
no reason for compelling the trustee to institute a plenary action
in order to obtain affirmative relief where, as here, the issues
adjudicated as defenses to the claim would be res judicata in the
plenary suit.8 5
While it is doubtful that the preferences in Solar were com-
pulsory counterclaims under Federal Rule 13 (a),8 6 the opinion does
indicate the position of the Third Circuit on compulsory counter-
claims. So far as the case indicates permissive counterclaims could
not under any circumstances be summarily adjudicated, even for an
alleged section 67 preference, Katchen casts doubt on its authority.
The res judicata point raised in the quoted portion above has,
of course, been approved by the Supreme Court in Katchen.
8 7
E. Seventh Circuit
Judge Swaim brought the problems of our subject into good
focus in his opinion in In the Matter of Majestic Radio & Television
Corp.8 The claimant, a former director of the bankrupt corpora-
tion, filed his proof of claim in the amount of 1,482 dollars for
goods sold the bankrupt, and the trustees filed an offset and counter-
claim in the amount of 442,067 dollars based on alleged breaches
of fiduciary duty by the claimant while he had been a director of
the bankrupt and its subsidiary.8 9 Upon motion of the claimant, the
trustees' objection, set-off, and counterclaim were dismissed by the
district court, sitting as the bankruptcy court, on the ground that
mere filing of a proof of claim did not constitute implied consent
to adjudication of counterclaims arising out of transactions dif-
ferent from the one on which the claim was based.90 The Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed on the same ground.
The trustees contended that section 68a commanded all mutual
Or Id. at 331.
"The trustee alleged dereliction of duty by the creditor in its capacity as in-
denture trustee of some outstanding bonds of the bankrupt. Yet none of the
creditor's claims concerned these bonds. It is therefore questionable whether a com-
pulsory counterclaim arose. Nonetheless, the court felt the counterclaim was "re-
lated" to the claim, and the holding of the case is clearly limited to such "related"
counterclaims.
"See text accompanying note 64 supra; ef. Comment, 34 FORDHAM L. Rv. 469,
477 n.64 (1966).
"8227 F.2d 152 (7th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 850 U.S. 995 (1956).
89 227 F.2d at 154.
"0 Ibid.
Vol. 1966: 669]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
debts to be set off against each other. The court agreed, but denied
that a bankruptcy court could determine whether there were mutual
debts. 91 The reference to "account ... stated" in section 68a was
held to refer not to a claim for unliquidated damages but to "'an
agreement between the parties to an account based upon prior
transactions between them.' "92 The trustees further argued that
Federal Rule 13 (b), relating to permissive counterclaims, impliedly
conferred jurisdiction on bankruptcy courts to try such counter-
claims. The court answered that no federal rule could enlarge
bankruptcy jurisdiction, and that rule 13 (b) was inconsistent with
the Bankruptcy Act (apparently referring to section 23).93
Quoting sections 23a and 23b, the court held that section 23b,
absent consent of the claimant, took jurisdiction of the trustee's
counterclaim away from the bankruptcy court, since the claim was
not one on a preference or other void or voidable transfer arising
under sections 60, 67, or 70, the sections excepted from the opera-
tion of section 23b.0 4 The court went on to hold that the claimant
had not consented to the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court to
determine the trustees' permissive counterclaim or waived his right
to object to such jurisdiction. It distinguished Luther, Solar, and
another case, pointing out that in them the trustees' counterclaim
had arisen under one of the sections excepted from the operation
of section 23b.95 Thus, it appears that the court would have held
otherwise had the trustees' counterclaim been on such a void or
voidable transfer, even if permissive-a position in accord with the
Tenth Circuit's recent holding in Katchen.9 6 The court pointed
out that while many cases have held that filing a proof of claim
constitutes consent to be sued in bankruptcy court on related
counterclaims (and indicated that it would hold likewise in an ap-
propriate situation), there was no authority to uphold summary
jurisdiction so acquired on a permissive counterclaim. 97 Hillman
91 Id. at 156.
92 Id. at 157.
93 Ibid.
91 Id. at 155.
95 Ibid.
96 See text accompanying note 54 supra.
OT The court reasoned as follows on the subject of the bankruptcy court's jurisdic-
tion to determine compulsory and permissive counterclaims:
"It is obvious that filing a claim in a Bankruptcy Court is an implied consent to
summary adjudication by that court of any counterclaims based upon the subject
matter of that claim. A litigant could hardly claim a recovery on the basis of a certain
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was said to be not in point, because section 23 of the Bankruptcy
Act did not apply in the equity receivership proceeding there be-
fore the Supreme Court.9
The reliance of the Majestic court on section 23b seems unwar-
ranted. Although the court indicates it would have reached the same
result on a preference counterclaim as did the Supreme Court in
Katchen, it should be noted that the opinion of the Supreme Court
in Katchen indicated that section 23b is inapplicable where prefer-
ence counterclaims are in issue.99 Nonetheless, the decision in
Majestic can stand on the theory that consent gives jurisdiction not-
withstanding any statutory provision-a theory fully supportable
by the court's language quoted in footnote 97.
F. Fourth Circuit
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in Florance v.
Kresge,100 became the first court to apply the rule of Alexander v.
Hillman to a proceeding under the Bankruptcy Act. There, one
Kresge filed his claim (and an intervention petition) in a bankruptcy
proceeding. He asserted a claim accruing under a contract with
the bankrupt for the subletting of certain property. The court
upheld the right of the bankruptcy court to grant affirmative relief
on the trustee's counterclaim, which in fact arose from the same
transaction as the claim, and quoted with approval the language
in Hillman that the court could hear and determine all objections
and defenses to a claim.' 0 ' The court emphasized that the creditor
had made himself a party to the proceeding by filing his unsecured
claim, and stated:
fact situation without permitting the court to decide all of the legal consequences of
that situation. No party can invite summary adjudication on only part of the
relevant evidence relating to the subject matter of the claim. If all of such evidence
shows that each party is liable to the other the court will set off one claim against
the other and render judgment for only any balance found to be due. In other words,
if you invite a Bankruptcy Court to review a set of facts for your benefit, you invite
it to review all pertinent related facts even though they should tend to prove your
opponent's case. But it does not follow that by filing a claim a litigant has im-
pliedly consented to the summary adjudication in the Bankruptcy Court of a counter-
claim arising out of subject matter which has no relation to his claim. Here Franklin
did not consent to the adjudication of the trustees' counterclaim; he objected to it,
and the trial court upheld his objection." 227 F.2d at 156.
98Ibid. Contra, Chase Nat'l Bank v. Lyford, 147 F.2d 273, 276-77 (2d Cir. 1945).
'" Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 382 n.9; see Seligson & King, Jurisdiction and
Venue in Bankruptcy, 86 R.x. J. 73, 79 (1962). Compare text accompanying notes
105-06 and 118-20 infra.
10 93 F.2d 784 (4th Cir. 1938).
10 1 Id. at 786.
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We see no reason why the court of bankruptcy should not pass
upon the claims in favor of the bankrupt estate and set them off
against the claims filed against the estate and its receivers; and,
under the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Alexander v.
Hillman ... we see no reason why the court, which is a court of
equity even though exercising special statutory powers, should
not proceed to render judgment against Kresge for any balance
found to be due by him.10 2
In 1950, in Columbia Foundry Co. v. Lochner,03 the Fourth
Circuit again held that a creditor, by submitting his proof of claim,
consented to the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court to enter an
affirmative judgment against him on a counterclaim arising out of
the same transaction as the claim. There, the creditor's unsecured
claim was asserted for certain merchandise sold the bankrupt, and
the trustee's counterclaim, unrelated to section 57 of the Bankruptcy
Act, was for damages caused by defects in the merchandise. It
was held that the filing of a claim by a creditor constituted consent
to the bankruptcy court's summary jurisdiction for related counter-
claims.le4
The Court's treatment of section 23 of the act, the section relied
on in Majestic to limit the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court, is
102 Ibid.
203 179 F.2d 630 (4th Cir. 1950).
1°'The court relied on Hillman and on its earlier opinion in Florance v. Kresge,
93 F.2d 784 (4th Cir. 1938). Quoting 4 CoI.UER 68.20[4], at 805-10, the court said:
"In respect to the filing of proofs of claim in bankruptcy, as consent to the juris-
diction of the court, Collier . . . says:
"'It is clear that where the plaintiff's petition is of such a nature that he submits
his cause to the bankruptcy court, and manifests a willingness that the court fully
determine his rights therein, such as in a reclamation petition, he consents to the
court's jurisdiction and cannot complain thereafter of the court's power to render a
judgment against him upon a proper set-off or counterclaim asserted by the trustee.
On the other hand, the mere filing of a proof of claim for allowance is not such a
clear expression of consent. It has been held in some cases that such a claim, without
more, does not constitute consent . . . . In Florance v. Kresge, however, the court
held [the opposite] . . . . In the light of expeditious administration of bankrupt
estates, and an avoidance of multiplicity of litigation, this decision has much to
recommend it. It would further serve to reduce the operation of the "absurdity of
making A pay B when B owes A."
"'One who files a proof of claim should be held to acquiesce in the adjudication
of any proper set-off or counterclaim even to the extent of a judgment thereon,
since . . . the claimant puts himself in a position, should his interests warrant, to
challenge the receiver's or trustee's acts and the demands of others claiming as
creditors. He should not be permitted to claim the benefits of such a position, and
yet maintain a favored advantage as against the trustee or receiver, compelling that
officer to resort to a plenary action to collect on a claim that is a proper subject of
set-off or counterclaim.'" 179 F2d at 632.
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an important aspect of the opinion. In speaking of the apparent
conflict between section 23 and section 68 relative to set-off and
counterclaim, Judge Soper characterized section 23 as primarily a
venue provision whose purpose it was to protect a defendant from
the inconvenience of defending a suit away from his home. The
court said that section 23 should apply only where the trustee
brings suit, not where a claim is filed against the trustee in the bank-
ruptcy court.10 5 Proceeding to section 68, the court stated:
There is naught in the text of the section which manifests an
intention to subject the trustee to any restriction in the use of a
set off that would not have applied to the bankrupt if sued before
his adjudication; and since in such an event the bankrupt could
have had an affirmative judgment against his adversary under the
ordinary rules of procedure, the trustee should be entitled to the
same advantage in winding up the estate. The creditor would
not be injured thereby, since the burden of opposing the counter-
claim is the same whether it is used as an offensive or defensive
weapon, and both parties are advantaged by disposing of both
claims in a single suit.106
In Continental Gas. Co. v. White,'0 7 the Fourth Circuit in 1959
again held that a court of bankruptcy could adjudicate a trustee's
counterclaim and enter an affirmative judgment against a creditor
who had filed a claim. The counterclaim was based on a preference
and was raised by way of a 57g objection. The trustee argued
that even permissive counterclaims could be summarily adjudicated
under the consent theory, but the court reserved judgment on the
point, having found that the counterclaim arose out of the same
transaction as the claim filed by the creditor. 08
G. Ninth Circuit
In 1960, the Ninth Circuit decided Peters v. Lines,0 9 in which
a creditor filed a claim alleging damages for breach of contract by
the bankrupt, and the trustee counterclaimed for breach of the same
contract. The bankruptcy court granted an affirmative judgment
to the trustee on his counterclaim, and was affirmed by the district
court." 0 The Ninth Circuit, agreeing with the principle of the
205 Id. at 633.
'1o Id. at 633-34.
207269 F.2d 213 (4th Cir. 1959).
108 Id. at 215.
1- 275 F.2d 919 (9th Cir. 1960).
2
10 In the Matter of Snow Camp Logging Co., 168 F. Supp. 420 (NMD. Cal. 1958).
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judgment below although reducing its amount, held that the
creditor, by filing his proof of claim, consented to the summary
jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court to render an affirmative money
judgment for the trustee on a counterclaim arising out of the same
transaction on which the claim was based.11' The court emphasized
that to force the trustee to split his cause of action in order to obtain
affirmative relief would be illogical, and pointed out that the same
reasoning underlies Federal Rule 13 (a).112
The opinion of U. S. District Judge Mathes in In re Nathan"13
has become a landmark in this area. Witness the laudatory language
of Charles Elihu Nadler:
The reasoning of ... the Referee, and sustaining opinion of...
Judge Mathes, both following the pioneer approach of... Judge
Yankwich (In re Mercury Engineering Co.), are examples of
scholarly research, keen analysis, and courageous departure from
antiquated traditional thinking. Anyone interested in this area
of summary jurisdiction must read In re Nathan."14
There, the trustee, in response to a creditor's claim for 13,000 dollars
based on the bankrupt's promissory note, filed a counterclaim to
recover preferences in the amount of 54,000 dollars. In reviewing
the question of whether the creditor should be allowed to withdraw
his claim, Judge Mathes was faced with the problem of deciding
whether the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to entertain the trus-
tee's affirmative counterclaim." 5 He held, in part, that since an
adjudication of the defenses and set-off to the claim would be res
judicata in a plenary suit, the legal' result of allowing a plenary
suit on the counterclaim would be the same as if consent had been
given the bankruptcy court to entertain the affirmative counter-
"" 275 F.2d at 925. The court quoted with approval the distinction made in In
the Matter of Majestic Radio & Television Corp., 227 F.2d 152 (7th Cir. 1955), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 995 (1956), concerning the difference between counterclaims arising
from the same and from separate transactions. 275 F.2d at 925 & nA.
211 The court cited with approval (275 F.2d at 925) the opinion in In the Matter
of Farrell Publishing Corp., 130 F. Supp. 449, 453-54 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), concerning the
interrelation of the consent theory with rule 1(a).
112 98 F. Supp. 686 (S.D. Cal. 1951).
2
11 Nadler, Summary Jurisdiction to Render Affirmative Judgment on Counter.
claims, Setoffs and Reclamations, 29 REF. J. 39, 42 (1955). (Footnote omitted.)
21r,"If the bankruptcy court does not have such jurisdiction, then ...that court
could not properly permit the claim to be withdrawn because the trustee's counter-
claim for the preference would not 'remain pending for independent adjudication'-
the prerequisite to withdrawal provided in Rule 41 (a) (2) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure." 98 F. Supp. at 691.
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claim.116 Additionally, the policy of the Bankruptcy Act, said Judge
Mathes, is to effect a quick and summary disposal of questions arising
in the case, and no substantial right of the creditor would be im-
pinged by allowing summary adjudication.11 7 Therefore, filing a
claim was held to constitute consent to jurisdiction.
H. Second Circuit
In Chase Nat'l Bank v. Lyford," 8 a section 77119 railroad reor-
ganization, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, relying on
Hillman, upheld the bankruptcy court's right to consider an affirma-
tive money judgment against the claimant bank. The court dis-
posed of the bank's contention that section 23 of the Bankruptcy Act
rescued it from the summary jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court by
holding that the filing of a claim by the bank waived the venue
provisions of section 23. The court said:
The bank contends that, under section 23 . .. no summary pro-
ceedings as to the bank balance can be brought against the bank
over its objection, because it is, in that respect, an adverse claim-
ant. That contention (which of course relates not to "jurisdic-
tion" but to venue) we consider untenable.
... The Supreme Court [in Alexander v. Hillman] ... said:
"By presenting their claims respondents subjected themselves to
all the consequences that attach to an appearance .... " We think
that the doctrine of that case is not limited to a case where claims
are filed by wrong-doing officers and directors (or the like). And
we see no reason why that doctrine is not applicable to proceed-
ings under section 77, no reason why the venue provisions of sec-
tion 23 were not waived when the bank filed its claim against the
debtor here.120
A New York district court in In the Matter of Farrell Publishing
Corp.121 in 1955 also held that the Hillman doctrine applied to a
bankruptcy proceeding. The court stated that filing of a claim im-
plied consent to the exercise of the bankruptcy court's summary
jurisdiction to grant affirmative relief on the trustee's "compulsory"
counterclaim. 122 The filing of a claim was likened to institution
"'a Id. at 691-92.
11
7 Id. at 692.
118 147 F.2d 273 (2d Cir. 1945).
219 Bankruptcy Act § 77, 49 Stat. 911 (1935), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 205 (1964).
120 147 F.2d at 276-77. (Footnotes omitted.)
121130 F. Supp. 449 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
12 Id. at 452.
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of an action in federal court, where a defendant must assert his
compulsory counterclaim or lose it. 1 23
The dictum of Judge Learned Hand in Conway v. Union Bank
of Switzerland, 24 a chapter X proceeding, sheds further light on
the thinking of the Second Circuit. The court noted that a creditor
or stockholder, by intervening to assert his interest in the assets, be-
comes a party to the proceeding and "exposes himself to every de-
fence that the insolvent may have to his claim, including set-offs
or counterclaims . ,,."125 Judge Hand reasoned that "any counter-
claim" should be enforced in its entirety in that a debtor would
otherwise be "forced to split his claim, recovering enough of it in
the insolvency proceeding to cancel the claim, but being obliged to
seek out the creditor where he could get personal jurisdiction over
him in order to recover the remainder."' 26 He noted further that
the plenary suit would raise only a "formal obstacle" to affirmative
recovery on the claim, since the decision on the set-off in the in-
solvency proceeding would conclusively settle all the facts.l27
In Nortex Trading Corp. v. Newfield,128 the Second Circuit
recently upheld an order of the district court allowing the referee
to enter an affirmative money judgment on the trustee's order to
show cause alleging a preference of 118,000 dollars. The court,
while not specifically referring to the Federal Rules, held that the
filing of a claim by a creditor is analogous to the commencement of
an action,'2 9 and relying on Inter-State Bank v. Luther, Conway v.
Union Bank, In re Solar Mfg., and In re Nathan the court stated that
counterclaims by a trustee are within the bankruptcy court's sum-
mary jurisdiction, and the claimant is deemed to consent to this
summary jurisdiction upon filing its proof of claim.8 0 Since the
trustee's order to show cause 'was in the nature of an answer with
request for affirmative relief and thus within the jurisdiction of
the bankruptcy court, personal service was held not to be neces-
sary.13'
223 Id. at 452-53.
12,204 F.2d 603 (2d Cir. 1953), cert. dismissed per stipulation, 350 U.S. 978 (1956).
125 204 F.2d at 607.
226 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
128 311 F.2d 163 (2d Cir. 1962).
,120 Id. at 164 (citing In the Matter of American Anthracite & Bituminous Coal
Corp., 22 F.R.D. 504 (SD.N.Y. 1958)).
230 311 F.2d at 164.
131 Ibid.
[Vol. 1966: 669
Vol. 1966: 669] JURISDICTION IN BANKRUPTCY 691
The Nortex court did not distinguish between compulsory and
permissive counterclaims, and it does not appear from the opinion
which was involved. 32 It would appear that the door has thus been
left open for summary jurisdiction over permissive counterclaims.
A review of Second Circuit cases would not be complete with-
out some mention of Kleid v. Ruthbell Coal Co., 33 one of a number
of cases which held that an objection of the trustee under section
5 7g could only be a defense and not a counterclaim, and that a
plenary suit would be necessary to invalidate a preference or
voidable transfer. 3 4 Obviously, these cases have been overruled by
Katchen.
I. Fifth Circuit
Until recently, the Fifth Circuit has exhibited great reluc-
tance to extend summary jurisdiction. In B. F. Avery &' Sons v.
Davis'3 5 the court of appeals in a 5 7g proceeding held that the
bankruptcy court may not grant any money judgment on the
trustee's counterclaim on a preference, but must hold the claim
until a plenary suit is prosecuted. This has clearly been over-
ruled by Katchen, but the decision nevertheless may shed some
light on the Fifth Circuit's attitude toward non-57g objections and
counterclaims. However, it is submitted that Avery should not be
regarded as impinging upon the Hillman doctrine, since the court
failed to face the consent question arising from the case's facts. The
court erroneously likened the trustee's action to a turnover order
and then applied the usual test of possession to hold that the bank-
ruptcy court lacked jurisdiction. 136 In that the court failed to discuss
the consensual aspect of the creditor's claim, it is difficult to accord
Avery great authority on the question at hand. Regrettably, how-
ever, the case has been considered controlling by some courts. 3 7
X2The character of the counterclaim is not apparent from the lower court
opinion either. In the Matter of Kaunitz & O'Brien, 205 F. Supp. 259 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
1-- 131 F.2d 372 (2d Cir. 1942).
134 E.g., Triangle Elec. Co. v. Foutch, 40 F.2d 353 (8th Cir. 1930); Atwood-Larson
Co. v. Hasvold, 280 Fed. 385 (8th Cir. 1922) (by implication).
113 192 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 945 (1952).
230 This same contention was made in Nortex Trading Corp. v. Newfield, 311 F.2d
163 (2d Cir. 1962), but was there properly rejected.
137In re Houston Seed Co., 122 F. Supp. 340 (N.D. Ala. 1954), is a holding dis-
allowing permissive counterclaims upon the "controlling" authority of Avery. See
also In re Tommie's Dine & Dance, 102 F. Supp. 627 (N.D. Tex. 1952). It should be
noted that the counterclaims in both these cases arose from different transactions
than the claim.
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Perhaps more important is the Fifth Circuit's recent decision
in Gill v. Phillips,13 in which the court noted that most circuits
have now adopted the proposition that the filing of a proof of claim
constitutes consent to the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction on matters
arising out of the same transaction upon which the proof of claim
was based. Since Avery involved an unrelated counterclaim, said
the court, the position of the Fifth Circuit on related counter-
claims is "not clear."' 39 Gill appears prophetic of the attitude of
the Fifth Circuit. On rehearing, the court said:
[O]n the remand the referee is free to allow appropriate amend-
ments to the pleadings and conduct further proceedings on this
point [whether the counterclaim arose out of same transaction]
if it is procedurally feasible to do so. As we pointed out in our
opinion, it would not necessarily be inconsistent with B. F. Avery
& Sons, Inc. v. Davis ... to premise summary jurisdiction on
such a theory. 40
J. -Tenth Circuit
The Tenth Circuit opinions in Katchen and Inter-State have
already been discussed.
VII
WHERE Do WE Go FROM HERE?
We still have no Supreme Court pronouncement on non-57g
compulsory counterclaims, on permissive counterclaims generally,
and on the validity of the consent theory. Nor do we know whether
the claimant may, if he carefully and expressly does so in his claim,
preserve his right to a plenary suit on any subsequent counterclaim
the trustee may raise. Additionally, even where a 57g counterclaim
is raised, we do not know what form the referee's order should
take, or how it will be enforced.
A. Non-57g Compulsory Counterclaims
The Katchen counterclaims were said by the Tenth Circuit to
arise out of the same transaction on which the claim was based.' 41
They were, therefore, compulsory counterclaims within the meaning
of rule 13 (a), but, being preference claims, they were included under
138 337 F.2d 258 (5th Cir. 1964), rehearing denied per curiam, 340 F.2d 318 (5th
Cir. 1965).
13 337 F.2d at 264.
140 Gill v. Phillips, 340 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1965) (denying rehearing per curiam).
141 See Katchen v. Landy, 336 F.2d 535 (10th Cir. 1964), af'd, 382 U.S. 323 (1966).
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section 57g. As previously pointed out, the Supreme Court bot-
tomed its decision on section 5 7g, and made no mention of rule
13 (a) nor of section 68.
However, since there is practically no dissent among the circuits
on the question of compulsory counterclaims arising out of the same
transaction, 142 it would come as the greatest surprise if the Supreme
Court reversed the trend in this area. The precise theory by which
they would be upheld is, however, open to question. The com-
monest ground employed by the courts of appeals has been, as we
have seen, that a creditor by filing a claim impliedly consents to sum-
mary jurisdiction in the bankruptcy court. The fact that it is diffi-
cult to find express statutory authority for such jurisdiction does not
seem to have caused much hesitation. The use of section 23 to estab-
lish jurisdiction appears improper, and the courts have been reluctant
to rely heavily on Federal Rule 13 (a). Nevertheless, the policies
of expedient administration and, especially, avoidance of multiple
suits, and the flexibility inherent in the equitable nature of bank-
ruptcy courts43 all militate toward adjudication of compulsory
counterclaims in summary fashion. Katchen certainly tends in that
direction.
B. Permissive Counterclaims
Those who advocate the extension of summary jurisdiction to
permissive counterclaims can derive considerable comfort from
Katchen. The Supreme Court relied heavily on Hillman and
quoted it at length, and the counterclaims in Hillman were per-
missive and sounded in tort, whereas the claims sounded in contract.
Katchen also placed great emphasis on the need for inexpensive
and expeditious bankruptcy administration. Obviously, to the ex-
tent that the trustee might be relegated to a plenary suit to recover
a permissive counterclaim, these needs would not be effectuated.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court's reasons for denying a jury
trial seem equally applicable to a permissive counterclaim as to a
57g situation.
It has been argued that if the referee had jurisdiction to enter-
tain permissive counterclaims, he might "find himself trying hotly
142 Even the Fifth Circuit in Gill v. Phillips, 337 F.2d 258 (5th Cir. 1964), re-
hearing denied per curiam, 340 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1965), left the door open on com-
pulsory counterclaims in its opinion on rehearing.
11 Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 327 (1966); Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295,
304 (1939); Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 240 (1934).
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contested slander cases, personal injury matters, or, indeed, any
cause of action known to the law."'144 This argument overlooks
the fact that section 70a (5) provides that, "rights of action ex delicto
for libel, slander, injuries to the person .... seduction, and criminal
conversation shall not vest in the trustee" unless subject to legal
process under state law.145 Certainly, the permissive counterclaim,
to be entertainable by a bankruptcy court, would have to fall into
the category of causes of action passing to the trustee under section
70.146
If, as Katchen would indicate, economy and expediency in ad-
ministration are overriding and dominant considerations, then, if
given the opportunity, the Supreme Court may give its blessing to
the extension of summary jurisdiction to the area of permissive
counterclaims.
C. May a Claimant Protect Himself by Careful Phrasing of
His Claim?
May a creditor file a proof of claim and reserve his right to a
plenary suit with respect to any counterclaim which the trustee may
register against him? There are cases which suggest that such an
effort might be successful.1 47
Probably such a tack would not succeed where a 57g objection
is at issue. The rationale of Katchen could lead to no other con-
clusion. No definite answer can be given, however, to situations out-
side of section 57g. Had the Supreme Court grounded its decision
in Katchen upon the claimant's implied consent to counterclaims
by invoking the court's summary jurisdiction, then those cases noted
above and the reasoning behind them would have validity-consent
could not be found where the claimant expressly conditioned his
appearance on non-consent. However, Katchen indicates that an
attempted reservation in a proof of claim would not be permitted to
defeat congressional intent. If Katchen is extended to non-57g areas
"I Palmer, The Supreme Court Speaks on Bankruptcy; A Review of Katchen v.
Landy, Segal v. Rochelle, and United States v. Speers, 40 REF. J. 44, 45 (1966).
"r Bankruptcy Act § 70a (5), 52 Stat. 880 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 110(a) (5) (1964).
14, "The trustee .. . shall . . .be vested . . .with the title .. . to all of the
following kinds of property . . . (5) .. . rights of action ... Provided, That [see text
accompanying note 145 supra] ..... Bankruptcy Act § 70a, 52 Stat. 879 (1938), 11
U.S.C. § 110(a) (1964).
247 See In re Eakin, 154 F.2d 717 (2d Cir. 1946); Glens Falls Ins. Co. v. Strom, 198
F. Supp. 450, 458-59 (S.D. Cal. 1961); In the Matter of Industrial Associates, 155 F.
Supp. 866, 871 (E3D. Pa. 1957); In re G. L. Odell Const. Co., 119 F. Supp. 578 (D. Colo.
1954).
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on the theory that congressional intent favors expediency and inex-
pensiveness, then an attempted reservation would probably be
deemed ineffective.
D. What Should Be the Form of the Referee's Order?
Where the referee grants affirmative relief, should it be in the
form of a money judgment, reciting that the trustee "have and re-
cover.., for all of which let execution issue," or should the referee
certify the matter to the district judge for the entry of a money judg-
ment by him? Or should the referee expressly direct the payment
of money to the trustee by the claimant? If so, how would such an
order be enforced? Normally, where orders of the referee are dis-
obeyed, as in a turnover order situation, the recalcitrant respondent
is certified to the district judge and contempt proceedings are held.
The reported decisions give us no help in answering these
questions. In Katchen, Judge Seth, in his concurring opinion, merely
said, "repayment of the total of such payments was ordered."' 48
The Supreme Court opinion stated only that "judgment was ren-
dered." 49
Certainly, no language in the Bankruptcy Act gives express au-
thority to the referee to enter a money judgment. This is a knotty
procedural problem, which can be easily settled and should be.
Since the passage of section 2075 of the Judiciary Code on October 3,
1964,150 the Supreme Court has had the authority to prescribe by
general rules "the forms of process, writs, pleadings, and motions,
and the practice and procedure under the Bankruptcy Act."'' The
Supreme Court is empowered, by this law, to amend the Bankruptcy
Act in any procedural respect. Much work is being done in this area
by the Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules under the chair-
manship of Judge Philip Forman. It is to be hoped that this problem
area, at least, can be quickly clarified.
The wheels of legislative change grind slowly. It will be several
years before the problems left unresolved by Katchen can expect
to be solved by Congress. Perhaps, in the interim, appropriate
cases will come to the attention of the Supreme Court and will
result in corrective judicial legislation.
148 336 F.2d at 538.
19 382 U.S. at 325.
18028 U.S.C. § 2075 (1964).
1 Ibid.
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